

The Importance of Intentions in Introspection

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1. Introduction

When it comes to the introspection of sensory states, two dominant views have emerged within the last few decades - process-based accounts and conceptual accounts. Whereas contemporary process-based theorists (e.g. Gertler, 2001; Goldman, 2006; Lycan, 1997) believe that some sort of *introspective attention* is necessary to have introspective access to one's sensory states, conceptualists (e.g. Dretske, 1994; Rosenthal, 2000; Tye, 2000) believe that introspection of sensory states is primarily the entertaining of *higher-order thoughts* about these states. The latter usually add that these higher-order thoughts are formed not by conceiving of the way things are, but by conceiving of the way things *appear*. Tye claims that "if you are attending to how things look to you, as opposed to how they are independently of how they look, you are bringing to bear your faculty of introspection" (2000, 46). Rosenthal states that introspection "tells us only how things appear, not how they actually are" (2000, 237), and Dretske argues that in introspection "we are conceiving of how things seem" (1994, 266-7). What it means to conceive of how things appear, remains mostly unclear. More specifically, although appearance statements are probably the most common way for people to express their introspective awareness of sensory states, it is hardly ever discussed, which appearance statements count as introspective and which do not. Hence, conceptualists (but also process-based theorists) should be interested in drawing the correct boundary between appearance statements that are introspective and those that are not. In what follows, I argue that the right criterion for drawing the right boundary needs to take into account a person's intention about the status of the appearance. A study of Austin's seminal work *Sense and Sensibilia* helps to get clearer on why this criterion is important and how it might be worked out in detail.¹

2. Distinguishing illusions from abnormal conditions

¹ In no way is it the task of this essay to evaluate the success of Austin's arguments against sense-datum theories. Instead, I will pick out several statements from chapter II, III, IV, and VII of *Sense and Sensibilia*, and show how they can help to shed light on the problem I have laid out above.

In *Sense and Sensibilia* Austin heavily argues against lumping things together that do not belong together. In chapter II, he raises the question of deception, and considers the way philosophers often fail to pay attention to important distinctions among the situations in which people entertain false perceptual beliefs about the world. Austin states:

"But surely the plainest of men would want to distinguish

- (a) cases where the sense-organ is deranged or abnormal or in some way or other not functioning properly;
- (b) cases where the medium - or more generally, the conditions - of perception are in some way abnormal or off-colour; and
- (c) cases where a wrong inference is made or a wrong construction is put on things". (1962, 13)

Cases that belong to the first category include illusions (e.g. Müller-Lyer lines) and hallucinations (e.g. afterimages, a ringing in the ears); examples like taking a white wall to be green because it is illuminated with green light, and believing a stick to be bent because the refraction index of water is different to that of air, belong to the second group. Mistaking a sponge for a rock - a typical example used in appearance-reality tasks² - would be a case of the third type.³ One way people seem to distinguish the latter two categories from the first one is to "say that his senses were deceived rather than that he was deceived by his senses" (1962, 13). However, Austin is not only correct in claiming that people distinguish these cases from each other, he is also right in focusing our attention on the functional differences of these categories. It is simply wrong to argue that a person is deceived by his senses or even that his senses do not work *normally* in the latter two categories. Quite the opposite is the case: it would be a case of malfunctioning senses if the wall appeared to be white, or the sponge looked like a sponge.

² Flavell et al. (1983) systematically investigated children's ability to distinguish the appearance of an object from its real nature. In one such scenario, children are presented with a sponge which does appear to be a piece of rock.

³ Austin's wording in the above quote is quite problematic. First, it is not so much the sensory organ but the information processing in the sensory and cognitive cortices, that is *responsible* for the occurrence of illusory and hallucinatory experiences. Second, classifying illusions as cases of malfunctioning senses is controversial. Arguably, the sensory system works fine, and only different to what one might expect the system to work. Third, labelling conditions as abnormal only makes sense if there are normal conditions. However, specifying the normal or standard conditions of perception is very difficult. Fourth, distinguishing category (a) from category (b) is presumable based on a distinction between the *external* (sensory-independent) and the *internal* (sensory-dependent) realm. Drawing this boundary is also complicated, e.g. do the eyes belong to the external or the internal realm? As we will see in this section, whether (a) and (b) can be clearly distinguished or are merely vague categories, does not matter in the end for the conclusions I would like to make. Thus, despite these difficulties, I assume that we can make a sufficiently clear distinction between misleading perceptual conditions that are external to the sensory apparatus and cases in which the senses themselves deceive. Note, however, that hereafter I use the term *illusions* only for cases in which the senses themselves deceive; the Müller-Lyer example is an illusionary case, whereas the bent stick phenomenon is not.

Austin points out the various different ways in which people make false statements about how things are in the world. However, we often know or suspect that we are in a situation in which it would be wrong to take what we seem to perceive at face value. In those situations, we often express this state of affairs by making appearance statements. E.g. we state that ‘the Müller-Lyer lines only appear to be of different lengths’ (illusion), ‘my phone only appears to be ringing’ (hallucination), ‘the wall looks green to me but it is white’ (unusual lighting conditions), ‘the sponge looks like a rock’ (unusual surface conditions). Although the first two of these statements fall into category (a), and the latter two into categories (b) and (c) respectively, we seem to express ourselves in very similar ways, namely, making a distinction between how things appear to us, and how they really are. It should therefore not be surprising that many philosophers have considered these statements to be introspective in nature (Schwitzgebel, 2012; Nichols & Stich, 2003). The question I will investigate in the next few paragraphs is whether Austin’s analysis is important for the classification of judgements as introspective or not, and whether philosophers should pay more attention to the reasons why people make appearance-statements.

3. Are appearance statements open to public challenge?

Let me start with two important points about the relationship between appearance statements and introspective judgements: First, no philosopher seriously believes that every appearance statement is an introspective judgement. Probably the most common way appearance words are put to work, is in the epistemic sense. When appearance words are used in the epistemic sense, “then ‘x appears so-and-so to S’ may be taken to imply that the subject S believes, or is inclined to believe, that x is so-and-so. And I think that, in this same use, they may be also taken to imply that the subject S has adequate evidence for believing that x is so-and-so” (Chisholm, 1957, 44). In all cases in which the evidence is not directly given in sensory experiences but is inferred from one’s experiences, the question of whether the resulting appearance statement is introspective does not even arise, e.g. ‘he seems to be sick, from what I heard’. Second, for some appearance statements it simply doesn’t make sense to make an appearance-reality distinction, e.g. ‘she looks great’. There is a sense of this expression which does not allow for someone to respond, ‘well, she looks great but she isn’t.’ The original claim was not at all meant to describe the woman as great, but ‘great’ was supposed to refer solely to her looks. Austin rhetorically asks: “what more must she do to *be chic* than to

look chic?” (1962, 38, italics in original). Thus, these examples are clearly not cases in which a person introspects his experience.

In the course of analysing various appearance statements in chapter IV, Austin touches on different senses of appearance words that have been argued for by philosophers such as Chisholm (1957), Jackson (1977) and Quinton (1956). Among these are the epistemic sense - which I have mentioned above, the comparative sense (e.g. ‘he looks *like* a pig’) and the phenomenal sense (‘the wall looks green’). However, none of those philosophers seem to think that the functional differences between Austin’s three categories (a), (b) and (c), have any bearing on the proper classification of appearance statements. In contrast, Austin makes an observation that deserves our attention. He states:

It is perhaps even clearer that the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation and challenge, as the way things are. I am not disclosing a fact about myself, but about petrol, when I say that petrol looks like water. (1962, 43)

If we consider examples of category (b) and (c), Austin indeed makes an important point. The case of a white wall looking green because it is illuminated by green light, and the example of a sponge looking like a rock, seem to support Austin’s claim that the way things look is as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation and challenge as the way things are. When it comes to visual examples, the photo test can be often used to track whether the way an object appears is largely a fact about the world or not: The illuminated wall “can be photographed, seen by any number of people” (1962, 31), and will yield a greenish tone on the photo picture, and there is nothing in the picture of the sponge that suggests the object to really be a sponge. Hence, the statements ‘the wall appears green’, and ‘the sponge looks like a rock’ seem to be open to public confirmation and challenge. Is Austin correct, however, in claiming that *in general* appearance statements manifest an openness to public confirmation? Let us consider examples of category (a). The way the Müller-Lyer lines look to a person does not seem to be subject to public confirmation and challenge. Making a photograph of the lines will not yield lines of differing length on the photograph (assuming of course a head-on photo). More obvious examples are hallucinations, dreams and afterimages which are not subject to public confirmation, and of course cannot be photographed either. We can conclude, therefore, that Austin’s claim does not hold if we are deceived by our senses, as is the case in illusions and hallucinations. However, Austin also states in chapter VII:

"What is the real color of an afterimage? The trouble with this one is that we have no idea what an alternative to its 'real colour' might be. Its apparent colour, the colour that it looks, the colour that it appears to be? - but these phrases have no application here." (1962, 66) "And perhaps we should also mention here another point - that the question 'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us - in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. What alternative is there to being a 'real' afterimage? (1962, 69)

If the question of 'real or not?' does not apply to afterimages and hallucinations, then afterimages and hallucinations are of course not open to public confirmation and challenge. If objects or properties are open to public challenge, then the question of whether something is real or not, must find an application.⁴ Thus, we can interpret Austin's remark on the openness of appearance statements to public confirmation more charitably to be only applying to some appearance statements, like those that are usually uttered when the perception conditions are bad (b) or when we put a wrong construction onto things (c). What is more important for our discussion, is that we have established a feature of appearance statements used in cases of categories (b) and (c) which does not seem to hold for cases of category (a), namely that the appearance of things is usually open to public confirmation and challenge. The question remains, however, whether this difference suggests that appearance statements that are made when a person hallucinates or is subject to an illusion, are properly classified as introspective, and as non-introspective for cases of categories (b) and (c). Intuitively, this seems to be the case. If an appearance statement is about a worldly fact and hence open to public confirmation and challenge, then it cannot be about the experience the person entertains. In contrast, it seems that if a person hallucinates, or has an afterimage, her appearance statement needs to refer to her experience. However, that conclusion would be far too quick. It is of course possible for a person to introspect her sensory state even though the reason for why something appears to be different from the way it really is, is dependent on external conditions of perception; and surely, people can mistake the content of a hallucinatory experience for veridical content. Hence, a simple classification of appearance statements that

⁴ Austin rightly holds that although it might be unusual, optical phenomena are open to public confirmation, because we can "raise the question 'Is that a real rainbow?'" (1962, 80)

are made when someone is hallucinating as introspective, and appearance statements that are made when the conditions of perception are abnormal as non-introspective, seems false.

What really seem to matter and what I will argue for in the next section, are the intentions of the person making an appearance statement - whether she makes a statement she believes to be a fact about the world (non-introspective) or a statement which she believes not to be open to public confirmation (introspective).

4. The importance of intentions in introspection

People are often aware or at least suspect that the world appears different from the way it really is. However, they also often lack an understanding of the reasons why they make an appearance-reality distinction. Two examples might help to illustrate why many situations are not clear-cut cases, and that people are often ignorant about the correct reasons for a suspected appearance-reality difference. First, mirages are most commonly associated with a person traveling through the desert, suddenly seeming to see an oasis. Austin writes that “there seem to be different doctrines in the field as to what mirages are. Some seem to take a mirage to be a vision conjured up by the crazed brain of the thirsty and exhausted traveller (delusion), while in other accounts it is a case of atmospheric refraction, whereby something below the horizon is made to appear above it” (1962, 25). In fact, mirages are usually explained (and most frequently happen) by the bending of light rays from distant objects and can be captured on camera - and are thus to be classified as optical phenomena. Second, the moon illusion is a phenomenon that occurs when people look at the moon which is just above the horizon. The moon appears to be larger on the horizon than it is high up in the sky. It was originally thought that due to light refraction in the atmosphere, the moon on the horizon occupies more space in the visual field than it would normally do. However, the moon illusion is not an optical phenomenon but is explained by the workings of our perceptual apparatus, and thus cannot be captured on a photograph.

We can see from these two examples that people can be justifiably uncertain about whether the appearance of an object is different from its reality due to external physical conditions or internal psychological conditions. Sometimes it is simply very difficult to ascertain the reasons for a difference in appearance and reality. Misattributions of this difference go both ways: mirages are often misattributed to deranged sensory perception, the moon illusion is often misattributed to the physical properties of the

atmosphere. But the possibility of misattributions also has the consequence that what an appearance statement expresses, depends on which state - physical or psychological - is blamed for the conceived difference between appearance and reality. Although the appearance statement 'the moon appears larger on the horizon' is usually not taken to be subject to public confirmation or challenge, a person can say the same words but express a different appearance statement, one that he thinks expresses openness to public confirmation. Similarly, although the appearance statement 'there seems to be an oasis' is usually taken to be subject to public confirmation, a person can utter the same sentence, but use the sentence in a different sense which precludes public confirmation. We can see that there seem to be two different appearance statements at play, by considering two sets of dialogues, one for the mirage example, the other for the case of the moon illusion.

In the first conversation, the conversing people both know that mirages are optical phenomena. They believe the appearance to be subject to public confirmation and thus do not take the appearance statement to be an introspective judgement.

Mirage talk 1: Non-introspective appearance talk:

S1: There appears to be an oasis over there.

S2: Yes, indeed, but how distant do you believe it really to be?

S1: Hard to tell, but the air at the surface is very hot, so light rays could come from far away.

The following conversation, in contrast, is introspective in nature. Both people refer to the experience of subject S1.

Mirage talk 2: Introspective appearance talk:

S1: There appears to be an oasis over there.

S2: You are starting to hallucinate. Take a sip of water, and rest for a while.

S3: Yes, my brain is starting to play tricks on me.

In the third dialogue, only one of the people knows the correct reason for why mirages happen. As he blames his experiences for what appears to him, we should, so I claim, classify his appearance statement as introspective. However, the other person understands the same statement as non-introspective.

Mirage talk 3: Introspective vs. non-introspective appearance talk:

S1: There appears to be an oasis over there.

S2: Yes, indeed, but how distant do you believe it really to be?

S1: What? It appears to you too? I thought I was having an hallucination.

S2: What are you talking about! The oasis is out there, but maybe not where we think it is.

The same difference in the meaning of appearance statements can be shown to occur when it comes to the moon illusion.

Moon talk 1: Non-introspective appearance talk:

S1: The moon appears to be larger on the horizon.

S2: Yes, it's amazing how the atmosphere bends the light rays.

Moon talk 2: Introspective appearance talk:

S1: The moon appears to be larger on the horizon.

S2: Yes, the illusion is astonishing.

Moon talk 3: Non-introspective vs. introspective appearance talk:

S1: The moon appears to be larger on the horizon.

S2: Not to me. It looks as large as if it were high in the sky.

S1: You cannot see it? But it is a physical phenomenon!

S2: No, it is a psychological illusion that some people don't get.

These conversations highlight the differing intentions which people can have when making appearance statements. If they consider the appearance statement to be open to public confirmation, they do not conceive of their mental states as representing the world in a certain way, but rather talk about how the world is independent of their experiences. In contrast, they might use an appearance statement to talk about their experiences themselves - statement which then of course should be classified as introspective.

Making a distinction between appearance and reality does not mean that people need to focus on both the appearance and the reality of objects or properties: people who think of the way an object appears, necessarily distinguish this appearance from the reality even if they believe the appearance to match reality. By drawing on Austin's insights in the last section, I claimed that people can either consider the appearance of an object to be *out there* in the world and thus open to public confirmation, or consider the appearance to be private, and thus closed to public confirmation. We are now in a position to determine the conditions for entertaining the concept of experience: subject S entertains the concept of experience iff,

(C1) S distinguishes the appearance from the reality of what is experienced.

(C2) S considers the appearance to be closed to public confirmation.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this essay, it is of interest to both conceptual accounts and process-based accounts to clarify how people think about their own or other people's experience. Merely thinking about experiences differs in two respects from the introspection of an experience: First, for the former it is not required that S attends to what it is that is experienced. Second, for the former there is no restriction on when the experience takes place. It also seems plausible to suggest that people can think about their experiences without having a very sophisticated idea of what experiences are. Statements like 'it appears to be p' are found in everyday conversations but are not used as introspective statements in many situations. Thus, there is a need to specify the minimal but also sufficient conditions for the possession of the concept of experience. (C1) and (C2) state that a person entertains the concept of experience, if that person makes an appearance-reality distinction (C1) and intends the appearance to be closed to public confirmation (C2). These two conditions have the advantage of specifying the conditions for entertaining the concept of experience in a non-circular way.

By analysing the literature on appearance statements, I have argued that Austin's claims about the nature of appearances proved helpful and underlined an intuitive appeal to the privacy of experiences. This has led me to conclude that the manifestation of an appearance-reality condition is insufficient to characterise introspective judgements, and that a further condition is needed. The development of the second condition (being closed to public confirmation) for introspection has important consequences. Not only are appearance statements often non-introspective, but more importantly: no appearance statement can be classified as

introspective without knowing whether the speaker intends the appearance to be open to public confirmation or not.

5. Objections

In the last section I explored a way to differentiate non-introspective from introspective appearance statements. I argued that merely drawing an appearance-reality distinction does not suffice for specifying how people introspect.⁵ The account I presented is heavily influenced by Austinian insights into the possibility of challenging and confirming the truth of appearance statements. Before I consider three putative objections, let me state the condition of introspection for appearance statements explicitly:

(Introspection) An appearance statement is introspective if and only if the person who makes an appearance statement intends the statement not to be open to public confirmation.

Objections against (Introspection) fall into two groups. The first objection asks whether knowing the intentions of a person regarding openness to public confirmation is really sufficient for classifying an appearance statement as introspective. I then discuss two further objections which consider the necessity of this criterion.

Objection 1: Confirming and challenging another person's experience?

The first objection to (Introspection) questions the proposed difficulty of confirming and challenging what other people experience. If it turns out that statements about experiences are often open to public confirmation, then it would make little sense to argue that introspective and non-introspective appearance statements can be differentiated by people's intentions about the proposed openness or closedness to public confirmation. In order to see why this objection has some superficial plausibility, let me restate the 'moon talk 2' conversation:

Moon talk 2: Introspective appearance talk:

⁵ Reuter (2011) shows that the sole condition of an appearance-reality distinction creates a problem not only for theories of introspection but also for theories of imagination.

S1: The moon appears to be larger on the horizon.

S2: Yes, the illusion is astonishing.

In the 'moon talk 2' conversation, S2 agrees with what S1 experiences. Hence, it seems that S2 confirms S1's experience, in contrast to my claim that introspective appearance statements are not intended to be open to challenge or confirmation. However, this objection rests on a confusion of what it means to be open to public confirmation with what it means to talk about each other's experiences.

When two people are subject to the same illusion (e.g. the moon illusion) and their visual apparatus work in roughly the same way, then it should not surprise us, that people can agree with each other on what it is like to have a certain visual experience. However, we can only *share* experiences in the sense of having different tokens of the same type. Having the same type of experience allows us to explain why two people can agree with each other on what they experience. This is very different from confirming another person's token experience, and can be most clearly appreciated, when one person's illusory experience is *in disagreement* with another person's experience. Segall, Campbell and Herskovitz (1963) conducted cross-cultural studies on the effect of origin and culture on the strength of the Müller-Lyer illusion. It turned out that people who live in urban areas perceive the lines to be of greater difference in length than people from rural areas. People who are subject to a strong Müller-Lyer illusory experience would in no way be able to challenge or confirm other people's lack of perceiving the illusion. Whereas they can still talk about their experiences and agree that what they report is in line with what other people report, they cannot confirm or challenge another person's experience.⁶

There is, however, a more threatening form of this objection which cannot be so easily refuted. Chances are that future brain scientists will find at least the neural correlates of conscious states. If this future becomes reality, then experiences would be no longer immune to public confirmation and challenge. We can imagine a person being connected to a machine that successfully confirms or challenges his introspective reports (see e.g. Armstrong, 1963). Many of course reject the idea that a person could not be the ultimate authority on his own mental states but this position requires regarding the person in these circumstances as infallible, and I agree with Austin when he states that "There is certainly nothing *in*

⁶ Thus, I disagree with Austin when he states: "But when I see an optical illusion, however well it comes off, there is nothing wrong with me personally, the illusion is not a little (or a large) peculiarity or idiosyncrasy of my own; it is quite public, anyone can see it, and in many cases standard procedures can be laid down for producing it." (1962, 24) Austin is right in pointing out that if a person is subject to an optical illusion then there is nothing wrong with that person (rare cases aside), but Segall et al.'s research clearly demonstrates that illusions are not public in the same sense as optical phenomena, like seeing a stick in water or a white wall being illuminated by green light.

principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement that so-and-so looks such-and-such." (1962, 42, italics in original) Whether or not this is true is not important in this context. It is certainly not *necessarily* true that a person is the ultimate authority on his own mental states. Thus, in a world in which brain scientists indeed have access to a person's experiences, this person can still think about his experiences without considering the experience to be private. It seems therefore that the privacy of experiences is only a contingent property of experiences but not essential. There are two answers that I would suggest to counter this objection. First, it may well be the case that if such a future indeed becomes reality, our conception of experiences changes, i.e. people who are constantly connected to 'read-out'-machines stop to consider their experiences (or other mental states like propositional attitudes) to be private mental states but accept that states of the mind are just as open to public confirmation as fruits and vegetables. This change in our conception of experiences does nothing to undermine the view that our current conception of experiences takes experiences to be private mental states. Second, it is quite plausible to hold that if future research shows that experiences cannot be considered to be essentially private, people nevertheless think of their experiences as private states in standard circumstances, i.e. when they are not connected to such a 'read-out' - machine. It is hard to imagine that people would accept having their mental lives under constant observation, and thus the scientific conception of experiences might change without the folk conception of experiences following suit.

Objection 2: Classifying appearance statements by other means

In this essay I have argued that appearance statements are themselves indeterminate as to whether they are introspective or not, and that we need to respect the importance of intentions regarding openness to public confirmation for introspection. An objection against the necessity of this criterion points out that instead of considering the reasons why something might appear different from the way it really is, people have found a much easier way to introspectively express their mental states, namely by specifying to *whom something appears*. People not only often state that something appears a certain way, but that something appears *to them* a certain way, e.g. 'It appears *to me* that the lines are the same in length', 'It appears *to me* that the wall is green.' Whereas other appearance statements do not specify to whom something appears, it seems that this type of appearance statement relates the appearance to a certain person. This way of expressing sensory experiences seems to be fulfill the requirement of privacy and at the same time seems to be less demanding

than thinking about public confirmation and challenge. But this conclusion would be too quick. Although it is true that people often use phrases such as ‘it appears to me’ when they communicate appearances that are closed to public confirmation, in many circumstances people can say that something appears to them without taking those appearances to be privately owned. As an example, we can consider a slight modification of an appearance-reality task in which a white car is placed behind a red filter.⁷ Imagine that you sit opposite to another person, and both of you look at the white car. A red filter is then positioned between you and the white car. We can now ask what the car looks to you and what it looks to the person who sits in opposition to you and whose view of the car is not distorted by the red filter. You will probably answer that the car looks red to you and that it looks white to the other person. However, you use the phrase ‘it looks to me’ without necessarily reflecting on your experiences. The reason why the car appears red to you and white to the other person is *found* in the outside world itself and does not depend on your sensory system. Thus, although the car looks red to you, and white to another person, the respective claims are nonetheless open to public confirmation. The other person could even go around the filter and check whether what you communicate about the outside world is correct.

Objection 3: (Introspection) requires people to be rational.

In developing a condition for classifying appearance statements as introspective or non-introspective, I argued that we need to know whether a person who makes an appearance statement, intends the statement to be open to public confirmation or not. Furthermore, I claimed that a person will intend the appearance statement to be open to public confirmation if he believes that the way things appear to him, is a fact about the world. This claim, so one might object, rests on a certain demand on a person’s rationality. We can easily imagine a stubborn person, let’s call him Stub, who, although making an appearance statement about the world, does not intend the statement to be open to public confirmation. E.g. despite being presented with good arguments in favour of the view that the white wall looks green (it is illuminated with green light), Stub claims and insists that the white wall appears to be blue, and that no evidence can convince him of the opposite. Thus, although the person does not refer to his experience but to the colour of the light that is reflected from the white wall, it seems that he intends his statement not to be open to public confirmation. This objection raises the possibility that an irrational person can make an appearance statement and intends

⁷ These tasks are known in the psychological literature as perspective-taking tasks, see e.g. Taylor & Flavell (1984)

this statement not to be open to public confirmation, but still does not refer to his experience. Stub might indeed be irrational in rejecting another person's claim that green light is reflected from the white wall despite good evidence for this position. However, as soon as Stub rejects another person's appearance statement that is equally supposed to be about a worldly matter, then Stub's appearance statement is open to public challenge too. This is so, because Stub can only argue against the truth of another person's appearance statement by giving a reason why it is false which then would count as an argument in favour of his own position, and thus makes his appearance statement open to public confirmation. This contrasts with introspective appearance statements. It is simply not possible to present a reason to support the claim that one has a green experience. In Austin's terms, we can say that the question of 'real or not' does not apply.

6. Conclusion

Austin was right to point out that people distinguish between hallucinations and illusions on the one hand, and cases where the external conditions of perception are abnormal on the other hand. He was also correct to argue that appearance statements are usually open to public confirmation. I have argued in this essay, that we can use these insights by Austin to draw an interesting conclusion for the status of appearance statements: although we use the same appearance words for both categories, if an appearance-statement is *intended* by the speaker to be open to public confirmation, it cannot be introspective. Only if a speaker thinks that what appears to him is closed to public confirmation, is an appearance statement truly introspective.

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